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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 On April 18–19, 2016, James Goss was tried in the Circuit Court for Baltimore 
City for attempted first degree murder (Count I), attempted second degree murder (Count 
II), first degree assault (Count III), assault against a police officer (Count IV), three 
counts of second degree assault (Counts V, VIII, and X), reckless endangerment (Count 
VI), and three counts of carrying a deadly weapon openly with intent to injure (Count 
VII, IX, and XI).  Case No. 115215011.  On the second day of trial, prior to jury 
deliberation, the State issued a nolle prosequi on Counts IV, VI, IX, and XI.  (Tr2. 8–9).  
The jury acquitted Mr. Goss of Counts I and II, but found him guilty of Counts III, VII, 
VIII, and X. (Tr2. 191–92). No verdict was rendered for Count V (second degree assault 
against Officer Parris) as the jury had found Mr. Goss guilty of the first degree assault 
charge. (Tr.2, 184). On May 25, 2016, the court sentenced Mr. Goss to twenty-five years 
on Count III, three years concurrent for Count VII, five years consecutive for Count VIII, 
and three years consecutive for Count X, for a total of thirty-three years.  (Tr3. 16).  Mr. 
Goss filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals on May 31, 2015.1  
This appeal follows. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Citations to the transcript are as follows:  
•   Tr1 = first day of trial, April 18, 2016. 
•   Tr2 = second day of trial, April 19, 2016. 
•   Tr3 = sentencing, May 25, 2016.	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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 
I.   Did the trial court err during voir dire when, despite requests from both the 
defense and the State, the court refused to ask if any potential jurors had 
strong feelings about the crime of assault against a police officer? 
II.   Did the trial court err in refusing to provide jury instructions on the issues 
of voluntary intoxication and involuntary intoxication when testimony 
supported the defense claim that Mr. Goss was substantially intoxicated at 
the time of the incident?  
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 James Goss graduated from Suitland High School in 2013.  (Tr2. 76).  He joined 
the Army in 2014, but was discharged following basic training so that he could be with 
his newborn son.  (Tr 2. 81).  James Goss enrolled in Saint Augustine University in the 
Spring of 2015.  At the end of the semester, he returned to Baltimore because he did not 
have summer housing at school, and he wanted to be near his young son, who was having 
surgery.  (Tr2. 76).  James Goss had trouble finding a place to live.  His only family in the 
area was his father, who would not let James live with him because he believed children 
over the age of eighteen should support themselves.  (Tr2. 77).  With nowhere else to go, 
Goss stayed with a friend from high school, Chardonnay Hall.  (Tr2. 80).  Ms. Hall was a 
student at the University of Baltimore and lived near campus at the Varsity Apartments 
on 30 West Biddle Street.  (Tr1. 173).  
 On July 16, 2016, about a month after he moved in with Ms. Hall, James Goss was 
leaving the Varsity when he saw a group of young men coming into the building with a 
box of liquor.  (Tr2. 85).  Although Goss did not know them, he struck up a conversation, 
joking to the group, “dang[,] nobody invited me to the party.”  (Tr2. 85).  They invited 
Goss to come, and gave him the apartment number and time of the party, which was the 
next evening.  (Tr2. 85).  
 The following day, James Goss spent the afternoon by himself, wandering around 
the Art Scape festival.  (Tr2. 84).  Around 7:30 p.m., he returned to the Varsity and went 
to the party alone.  (Tr2. 85).  There were about twelve or so people there when Goss 
arrived.  (Tr2. 85).  He didn’t know any of them.  (Tr2. 85).  Shortly after he arrived, one 
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of the hosts offered Goss a drink and food.  Goss grabbed two slices of pizza while the 
man poured him a drink in a red “Solo” cup.  (Tr2. 86).  Goss thought it was about six 
ounces of vodka.  (Tr2. 86). 
 Around 10 p.m.., James Goss and two men from the party left to go walk around 
Art Scape to find people to bring back to the party.  (Tr2. 87).  While he was gone, Goss 
left his unfinished drink in the unmarked cup on the counter.  (Tr2. 105).  When he 
returned an hour or so later,  he picked up his cup and finished his drink.  (Tr2. 107).  He 
quickly began feeling “dizzy” and “woozy” in a way that he had never felt before.  (Tr2. 
87–89).  He was also getting “tired,” so he left the party to go back to Ms. Hall’s 
apartment.  (Tr2. 87). 
 Ms. Hall had also been at Art Scape that day.  (Tr1. 193).  She returned to her 
apartment with a friend after dark.  (Tr1. 193).  At some point after she got home, James 
Goss returned to the apartment.  (Tr1. 194).  He told Ms. Hall he was drunk and wanted to 
have a threesome.  (Tr1. 194).  He then took her keys and left.  (Tr1. 194).  Later, Ms. Hall 
walked her friend out of the building, forgetting that Goss had her keys.  (Tr1. 176).  She 
sat in the lobby talking to the security guard while she waited for James Goss to return to 
let her in.  (Tr1. 176).  Around 11 p.m., Goss returned, walked past Ms. Hall and the 
security guard, and got on the elevator.  (Tr2. 17).  
 Ms. Hall decided to go up to see if her door was unlocked.  (Tr1. 176).  It was, but 
James Goss was not there.  (Tr1. 176).  In the kitchen, Ms. Hall found two full cups of 
alcohol on the counter and a large puddle of alcohol on the floor.  (Tr2. 193–194).  The 
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alcohol had not been there when she left, and she did not keep any alcohol in the 
apartment at the time.  (Tr1. 176). 
  Around 11:45 p.m., another resident complained to the security guard, saying 
James Goss was at the party and acting up after getting turned down by a female guest.  
(Tr2. 18).  When the security guard went upstairs, an individual standing outside the 
apartment told the guard that everything was under control.  (Tr2. 18).  
 Later that night, Ms. Hall heard banging on her apartment door.  (Tr1. 176).  It was 
James Goss and he was “completely intoxicated.”  (Tr1. 176).  Ms. Hall let him in and 
asked him to return her keys.  (Tr1. 177).  At first, Mr. Goss was “fine” and began to 
check his pockets for the keys.  (Tr1. 195).  However, when he couldn’t find them, he 
began to insist he had given the keys back to her earlier in the day when he returned from 
the computer lab.  (Tr1. 177).  Ms. Hall tried to explain to Mr. Goss that he was 
confused—the events he was describing had occurred on a different day.  (Tr1. 177).  Mr. 
Goss suddenly became angry and began to yell at Ms. Hall.  (Tr1. 195).  He accused her 
of “setting him up” and being “out to get him.”  (Tr1. 178).  Ms. Hall had always known 
Mr. Goss to be “nice” and “gentle.”  (Tr1. 195).   She had never seen him act like this 
before.  (Tr1. 195).  His behavior was “all over the place” and he was saying things that 
“really didn’t make sense.”  (Tr1. 195).  
 When Mr. Goss began to yell at Ms. Hall, she pushed him away.  (Tr1. 178).  Mr. 
Goss then punched her in the face and attempted to put her in a choke hold.  (Tr1. 178).  
Ms. Hall pried Mr. Goss’ arm off and screamed for help.  (Tr1. 178).  The security guard 
heard the yelling and went to Ms. Hall’s apartment.  (Tr1. 206).  He knocked on the door, 
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at which point James Goss grabbed two knives and said that he would “cut [them] both” 
if anyone came in.”  (Tr1. 178).  The security guard left to call 911.  (Tr1. 207).  
 Ms. Hall tried to calm James Goss down by talking about his son.  (Tr1. 179).  She 
was eventually able to take the knives from him, and he began crying and apologizing.  
(Tr1. 179; Tr1. 204).  Ms. Hall put those knives in her pocket, and ran out of the 
apartment to take the elevator downstairs.  (Tr1. 179).  James Goss grabbed a butter knife 
and another kitchen knife, and followed her out of the apartment.  (Tr1. 179).  When the 
elevator arrived, Mr. Goss got on but Ms. Hall did not.  (Tr1. 182).  
 Officer Anthony Callow, one of the police officers who responded to the 911 call, 
was in the lobby with the security guard when James Goss got off the elevator.  (Tr2. 24).  
Goss walked past them and towards the door.  (Tr2. 24).  Callow’s partner, Officer Teddy 
Parris, was just walking into the building.  (Tr2. 55).  When Goss attempted to exit the 
building, Officer Parris put up his arm and instructed Goss to step back inside.  (Tr2. 55).  
Before Officer Parris could finish his statement, Goss stabbed Officer Parris above his 
left eye.  (Tr2. 55).  The officer lifted Goss up and pinned him against the wall of the 
building.  (Tr2. 55–56).  Goss then began to stab the officer several times in the head and 
upper back area.  (Tr2. 56).  The injuries caused arterial bleeding from Officer Parris’ eye 
and ear, and left him with permanent nerve damage to his ear.  (Tr2. 59–60).  
 James Goss was eventually restrained by Officer Callow and the security guard 
who by that time had run outside.  (Tr2. 214).  Ms. Hall came downstairs after Goss was 
restrained.  (Tr1. 202).  She tried to speak to him, but he would not respond.  (Tr1. 200).  
He was screaming and saying things that did not make any sense, such as accusing Ms. 
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Hall of sleeping with the security guard.  (Tr1. 202).  Mr. Goss also repeatedly threatened 
to “cut somebody else” if he broke free.  (Tr1. 214).  As Officer Callow and the security 
guard carried Goss to the police car, Goss bit the security guard on his calf.  (Tr1. 216).  
 James Goss was taken to Johns Hopkins Hospital.  (Tr2. 113).  At the hospital, he 
continued to scream and act combative, and needed to be handcuffed to the bed.  (Tr2. 
113).  The medical records reflect that Goss was “highly intoxicated,” but the hospital 
staff did not complete a toxicology report to screen what might be in Goss’ system.  (Tr2. 
113).   
 During jury selection, both the State and the defense asked the trial court to screen 
for jurors who might have strong feelings about the crime of assault against a police 
officer.  (Tr1. 3–4).  Specifically, defense counsel asked the judge to inquire “Does 
anyone have such strong feelings about assaults against law enforcement that you would 
be unable to render a fair and impartial decision based on the evidence.”  (Tr1. 3).  Urging 
the trial court to ask some version of defense counsel’s requested question, the prosecutor 
agreed that jurors may have opinions about individual police officers and the police 
department that might impact their ability to be fair and impartial.  (Tr1. 4).  The trial 
judge denied these requests and following jury selection proceeded to trial.  (Tr1. 4).  
 Prior to jury deliberation, the trial judge reviewed proposed jury instructions with 
counsel.  (Tr2. 112).  The trial judge denied the defense request for instructions on 
voluntary intoxication and involuntary intoxication, stating there was not enough 
evidence to determine the extent to which James Goss had been impaired.  (Tr2. 122; Tr2. 
131).  
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 After the prosecution issued a nolle prosequi on several charges, the jury found 
James Goss not guilty of  attempted first degree murder or attempted second degree 
murder in connection with the attack on Officer Parris.  (Tr2. 192).  The jury convicted 
James Goss  on the remaining assault and weapons counts.  (Tr2. 192).  
 Despite James Goss’ relative youth and the fact that this was his first offense, the 
trial judge exceeded the recommended sentencing guidelines based on her belief that 
Goss “has a problem with authority figures” and is an “extreme danger to society.”  (Tr3. 
15–16).  James Goss was sentenced to the maximum sentence, twenty-five years, on the 
top count and eight consecutive years on two remaining counts for a total period of 
incarceration of thirty-three years.  (Tr3. 16). 
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ARGUMENT 
I.   DURING VOIR DIRE, THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
ASK THE REQUESTED, AND THEREFORE NECESSARY QUESTION: “DO ANY 
MEMBERS OF THE PANEL HAVE STRONG FEELINGS ABOUT THE CRIME OF 
ASSAULT AGAINST A POLICE OFFICER?”   
 
 During voir dire, both the State and the defense requested that potential jurors be 
screened to see if they had strong feelings about assaults against law enforcement 
officers.  (Tr1. 3–4).  The trial judge declined to ask this question based on the court’s 
view that a question about the weight of witness testimony adequately covered the same 
territory.  (Tr1. 5).  Contrary to the judge’s view, the strong feelings question was 
required under Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350 (2014).  The lower court’s failure to screen 
jurors for bias related to the crime charged constitutes reversible error. 
 A defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial is guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights.  Curtin v. State, 393 Md. 593, 600 (2006).  The right to a fair trial is protected 
in part by the process of voir dire—a process during which questions proposed by the 
court or parties are used to screen prospective jurors for bias or prejudice.  Id.  The 
court’s questions during voir dire should “focus on issues particular to the defendant’s 
case so that biases directly related to the crime, the witnesses, or the defendant may be 
uncovered.”  Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 10 (2000) (emphasis added).   
 Regarding crime-related biases, the Court of Appeals has acknowledged that “the 
potential for bias exists in most crimes.”  Shim v. State, 418 Md. 37, 54 (2011), abrogated 
on other grounds by Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 363 (2014).  Therefore, trial courts 
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are required to ask “voir dire questions which are targeted at uncovering these biases.”  
Shim, 418 Md. at 54.  The Court of Appeals suggested in Shim that such biases might be 
uncovered by asking “Does any member of the jury panel have such strong feelings about 
[the charges in this case] that it would be difficult for you to fairly and impartially weigh 
the facts[?]”  Id. 
 In Pearson, the Court of Appeals affirmed Shim’s essential holding that the trial 
judge, when requested, must ask prospective jurors about crime-related biases.  437 Md. 
at 363.  However, Pearson rejected the precise phrasing of the Shim question because it 
clashed with precedent.  Id. at 361.  Slightly tweaking the Shim language, the Pearson 
court instructed that  “on request, a trial court must ask during voir dire: ‘Do any of you 
have strong feelings about [the crime with which the defendant is charged]?’”  Id. at 363 
(emphasis added). 
 On review, an appellate court must determine whether the trial judge abused his 
discretion by conducting questioning that was “not reasonably sufficient to test the jury 
for bias, partiality, or prejudice.”  Washington v. State, 425 Md. 306, 314 (2012).  If a 
trial court is required to ask a specific voir dire question, the failure to do so “is an abuse 
of discretion constituting reversible error.”  Moore v. State, 412 Md. 635, 666-667 
(2010).  There cannot be “harmless error” if there is an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 667. 
For example, the failure to ask requested “strong feelings” questions about violations of 
narcotics laws, child molestation, and possession of a firearm all have been found to 
constitute reversible error.  See Curtin, 393 Md. at 610; Thompson v. State, 229 Md. App. 
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385  (2016).  However, the mandatory nature of a requested “strong feelings” question is 
not limited to these types cases.  See Pearson, 437 Md. at 363.  
 In the instant case, both the state and the defense requested that the court ask 
potential jurors about whether they had strong feelings regarding the crime of assault 
against a police officer.  (Tr1. 3).  The court refused to make this inquiry.  (Tr1. 4).  The 
trial judge’s failure to ask jurors if they had strong feelings about the incendiary crime 
they were being asked to judge—a brutal and seemingly senseless assault on a police 
officer—deprived Mr. Goss of his constitutional right to a fair trial.  See Curtin, 393 Md. 
at 600.  
 In denying the requested inquiry, the trial judge assumed that any potential bias 
concerning the crime charged would be properly uncovered by asking jurors if they 
would give more or less weight to the testimony of a police officer because several police 
officers were testifying.  (Tr.1. 4).  This assumption was wrong.  The “more or less 
weight question” is to determine whether potential jurors might “simply believe police 
officers by virtue of the position without regard to testimony from anyone else [or] would 
believe the police officers in comparison to civilian witnesses.”  Moore, 412 Md. at 653.  
A juror may be capable of assessing the credibility of all witnesses equally, and could 
thus rationally answer the court’s testimonial weight question, “no.”  But, this same juror 
may have such strong feelings about an attack on a police officer that she would be 
unwilling to accept any proposed defense to the crime.  
 The potential prejudice engendered by strong feelings about violence targeted 
against police officers was also not captured by the trial judge’s broader question of 
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whether potential jurors had “strong feelings about attempted murder in the first degree, 
attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, assault in the second 
degree, reckless endangerment, [or] carrying a deadly weapon openly with intent to 
injure.”  (Tr1. 22-23).  Here again, a potential juror may not feel particularly strongly 
about violent crime as a general matter, but may feel quite strongly that police officer’s 
should not needlessly be placed in harm’s way.  The generic variation of the “strong 
feelings” question failed to identify such biases directly related to assaultive crimes 
against a police officer. 
  In 2002, in an era where the “War on Drugs” was a household phrase, the Court 
of Special Appeals reasoned, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that jurors should be 
asked about the crime charged in narcotics cases due to the strong passions that crime 
might engender:  
“[l]aws regulating and prohibiting the use of controlled dangerous 
substances harbor an unusual position within our criminal code, such that 
jurors may be biased because of strong emotions relating to the dangers of 
narcotics and their negative effects upon our cities and neighborhoods, or, 
on the contrary, biases may exist because of passionate positions that 
advocate the decriminalization of narcotics.”  
 
Thomas v. State, 139 Md. App. 188, 207 (2001), aff’d in State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 
213 (2002), abrogated on other grounds by Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 363–64 
(2014). 2   In the instant case, the current political and cultural climate surrounding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The court in Thomas v. State noted that, at the time, there was much literature in the 
field of drug policy focusing on legalization, decriminalization, and medicalization.  139 
Md. App. 188, 204 (2001).  The court also noted that “[a]t the same time, the ‘drug war’ 
label transformed those who used drugs . . . into the enemy and then into a subhuman 
category of ‘druggies’ or ‘druggers.’  They ceased to be people with drug problems, 
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violence and policing raises similar concerns about the need to ask about juror’s “strong 
emotions” and “passionate positions” related to police-involved violence.  
 In the past several years, we have seen increasing national focus on conflicts 
between police officers and community members.3  In Baltimore, after the death of 
Freddie Gray, protests erupted in the city that left over fifteen police officers hurt, 235 
people arrested, and sixty structures burned.  Melanie Eversley, One Year Later, 
Baltimore Still Reeling from Freddie Gray Death, Riots, USA TODAY, April 18, 2016, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/04/18/one-year-later-baltimore-still-reeling-
freddie-gray-death-riots/83181808/.  
 Mr. Goss’ trial occurred less than a year after the protests in Baltimore impacted 
citizens throughout the city (and thus James Goss’ prospective jury pool).  His trial 
occurred a mere three months after tensions were reignited following the mistrial of the 
first officer tried in connection with Freddie Gray’s death.  Justin Fenton, Mistrial 
Declared in Trial of Officer William Porter in Death of Freddie Gray, BALTIMORE SUN, 
Dec. 16, 2015, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-porter-
trial-jury-wednesday-20151216-story.html. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
chemical disorders, or brain disease, and became the ‘bad guys,’ as the public’s hatred of 
drugs grew into a hatred of druggies.  For the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and 
DEA personnel who train State and local police, this hatred translated into a variety of 
practices: druggies and their families could be rousted, humiliated, terrorized, jailed, hurt, 
threatened with being shot, or even, if necessary, shot.”  Id. 
3 See, e.g., Amanda Sakuna and Tracy Jarrett, Protests Continue in NYC and Nationwide 
Over Garner Grand Jury, MSNBC, Dec. 4, 2015, 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/protests-continue-nyc-and-nationwide-eric-garner-grand-
jury; Ferguson Unrest: From Shooting to Nationwide Protests, BBC NEWS, Aug. 10, 
2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30193354. 
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In the months surrounding James Goss’ trial, there was also significant attention 
being paid to an increase in perceived retaliatory violence against police officers.  In 
December of 2014, two NYPD officers were ambushed and shot while in their patrol car.  
The perpetrator was a young black man, whose last social media post before the shooting 
“suggested he planned to kill police officers as revenge for the deaths of Michael Brown 
and Eric Garner.”  Rebecca Davis O’Brien, Ismaaiyl Brinsley Led Life of Trouble Before 
Attack, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 21, 2014, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ismaaiyl-brinsley-suspected-of-shooting-new-york-police-
had-criminal-history-ties-to-brooklyn-1419188892.  News outlets have reported that the 
number of ambush-style killings of police officers increased “dramatically” in the first 
half of 2016.  Emily Shapiro, Deadly Ambush Attacks Against Cops Have Increased 
Dramatically This Year: Inside the ‘Troubling’ Report, ABC NEWS, Jul. 27, 2016, 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/deadly-ambush-attacks-cops-increased-dramatically-year-
inside/story?id=40919862.  Likewise, fatal shootings of civilians by police officers also 
increased in the first half of 2016.  Kimberly Kindy, Fatal Shootings of Police are Up in 
the First Six Months of 2016, Post Analysis Finds, WASHINGTON POST,  July 7, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/fatal-shootings-by-police-surpass-2015s-
rate/2016/07/07/81b708f2-3d42-11e6-84e8-1580c7db5275_story.html.  
 As with narcotics in Thomas, citizens are likely to have passionate feelings, either 
positive or negative, about issues at the forefront of our national consciousness like 
violence by and towards police officers.  The risk of juror bias was high in Mr. Goss’ 
case, and the failure to make an inquiry into this particular prejudice deprived Mr. Goss 
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of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury.  The trial judge’s failure to ask the 
“strong feelings” question, as mandated by Pearson, clearly warrants reversal.  437 Md. 
at 363. 
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II.   BECAUSE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO 
DEMONSTRATE THE APPELLANT WAS INTOXICATED AT THE TIME OF THE 
INCIDENT, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
PROVIDE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION AND 
INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION 
 
 At the close of evidence, while reviewing jury instructions, the trial judge 
informed the defense that she would not provide the requested instructions regarding 
voluntary intoxication and involuntary intoxication.  In the trial judge’s view, there was 
not sufficient evidence presented at trial to warrant either instruction.  (Tr.2. 119).  
However, because some evidence was presented at trial that Mr. Goss was intoxicated, 
including some evidence that the intoxication may have  been involuntary, the trial 
judge’s abused her discretion in failing to provide these jury instruction.  Because the 
defense case proceeded on a theory of intoxication, this abuse of discretion clearly 
prejudiced Mr. Goss and therefore requires reversal.  
 In Maryland, the main purposes of jury instructions are “to aid the jury in 
understanding the case, to guide the jury's deliberations, and to help the jury arrive at a 
correct verdict.”  State v. Allen, 387 Md. 389, 396 (2005).  A judge is generally obligated 
to give an instruction requested by a party if “(1) the requested instruction is a correct 
statement of the law; (2) the requested instruction is applicable under the facts of the 
case; and (3) the content of the requested instruction was not fairly covered elsewhere in 
the jury instruction actually given.”  Atkins v. State, 421 Md. 434, 444 (2011).  This duty 
to instruct the jury includes an obligation to present the law that governs any defenses 
supported by “some evidence” adduced at trial.  Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 216 (1990).  
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 As the Court of Appeals has recognized, the “some evidence” standard imposes a 
rather low threshold: 
Some evidence is not structured by the test of a specific standard.  It calls 
for no more than what it says-“some,” as that word is understood in 
common, everyday usage.  It need not rise to the level of “beyond 
reasonable doubt” or “clear and convincing” or “preponderance.”  The 
source of the evidence is immaterial; it may emanate solely from the 
defendant.  It is of no matter that the . . . claim is overwhelmed by evidence 
to the contrary. 
 
Dykes, 319 Md. at 359. 
In determining whether “some evidence” exists, the court must view the evidence 
“in the light most favorable to the accused.”  General v. State, 367 Md. 475, 487 (2002).  
The trial judge is not permitted to weigh or disregard evidence that has been presented: 
When the trial judge resolves conflicts in the evidence, in the face of the 
“some” evidence requirement, and refuses to instruct because he believes 
that the evidence supporting the request is incredible or too weak or 
overwhelmed by other evidence, he improperly assumes the jury’s role as 
fact-finder.  
 
Dykes, 319 Md. at 224.  Even if there is substantial evidence contradicting the 
defendant’s claim, the defendant is still entitled to an instruction “if there is any evidence 
relied on by the defendant which, if believed, would support his claim.”  Id. at 359.  If the 
defendant was prejudiced by the trial court’s error in failing to give an instruction, this 
constitutes reversible error.  Harris v. Harris, 310 Md. 310, 319 (1987). 
 In the instant case, prior to jury deliberations, the court reviewed the proposed jury 
instructions.  The court denied defense counsel’s requested instructions on voluntary and 
involuntary intoxication.  (Tr2. 122, 133).  In rejecting the requested instructions, the trial 
court looked to Bazzle v. State, a case in which the court similarly refused to give a 
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voluntary intoxication instruction.  426 Md. 541, 556 (2012).  The trial judge in the 
instance case suggested that, under Bazzle, intoxication instructions are only required if a 
toxicology report or other expert testimony has been presented.  (Tr2, 120, 121).  Bazzle 
in fact contains no such requirement.  The lower court’s reliance on Bazzle to deny the 
instruction in the instance case was, thus, misplaced. 
 Bazzle was an appeal from the trial court’s refusal to give an instruction on 
voluntary intoxication.  426 Md. at 547.  In Bazzle, there was evidence the defendant had 
consumed a significant quantity of alcohol.  426 Md. at 546.  However, there was no 
evidence introduced as to the impact of that alcohol on the defendant’s functioning or 
state of mind.  Id. at 555.  Although the appellant in Bazzle suffered memory loss, the 
memory loss began after he was stabbed.  Similarly, the court found that testimony 
Bazzle was “about to pass out,” id. at 556,  was related to blood loss and not intoxication.  
Id. at 558.  Bazzle was also “speaking intelligibly” and his actions “demonstrate[d] a 
significant amount of design in planning the crime,” which was inconsistent with his 
theory of intoxication.  Id. at 557.  Upon this record, the Bazzle court emphasized that “it 
is not the amount [of alcohol] consumed but the effect [of that alcohol] on the consumer 
that is important.”  Id. at 553.  Where there was no testimony offered in the case about 
the effect on Bazzle of his heavy drinking, the court found no need for a jury instruction 
on intoxication. 
 In contrast with Bazzle, there was a great deal of evidence presented in the instant 
case to show how profoundly impaired James Goss became after consuming a drink at 
the party on the night he attacked Officer Parris.  Prosecution witness Chardonnay Hall 
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testified that James Goss was “completely intoxicated,” when she saw him after his return 
from the party.  (Tr1. 195).  In the several years she had known Mr. Goss, she had never 
seen him act in a similar manner before.  (Tr1. 201).  Instead, she had always known him 
to be a “gentle” and “nice” person.  (Tr1. 201).  Ms. Hall testified that when James Goss 
returned from the party his mood was “all over the place,” vacillating from calm, to 
violently angry, to crying.  (Tr1. 195).  James Goss was also out of touch with reality: he 
was confused about what day events had occurred; he was also paranoid—accusing Ms. 
Hall of being “out to get him,” and irrational—suggesting that Ms. Hall was sleeping 
with the security guard, who had worked in the building for only two days.  (Tr1. 184, 
205). 
The medical records following the incident confirmed Chardonnay Hall’s 
description of James Goss’ impairment.  These records described Goss as intoxicated and 
“out of control,” and he needed to be handcuffed to the bed for an hour before calming 
down.  (Tr2. 116).  James Goss testified that on the evening of the incident, he drank only 
about “half a cup” in total of vodka at a party.  (Tr2. 86).  He testified that he left the party 
with two other individuals to visit Art Scape, and they were gone for about an hour to an 
hour and a half.  (Tr2. 86).  During this time, Mr. Goss’ unfinished drink sat unattended in 
a “Solo” cup on a counter at the party.  When he returned, he picked up the cup and drank 
what was in it.  (Tr2. 104).  Mr. Goss testified that he stayed at the party for about an hour 
after he returned from Art Scape, and then left when he began to feel “dizzy” and 
“woozy.”  (Tr2. 87, 107).  He testified that he no longer felt in control of himself.  (Tr2. 
94), and that he had no memory of substantial portions of the night after finishing the 
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drink.  (Tr2. 88).  Mr. Goss believed he was drugged because he “never acted this way 
before” and he was unable to “remember anything that happened that night.”  (Tr2. 93).  
Thus, unlike in Bazzle, there was substantial evidence in the instant case about James 
Goss’ intoxication.  
 There was also a significant question about whether James Goss’ impairment had 
been caused voluntarily or involuntarily.  A defendant’s intoxication is “presumed to be 
voluntary unless some special circumstance is established to remove it from that 
category.”  Dubs v. State, 2 Md. App. 524, 542 (1967).  Such “special circumstance[s]” 
include mistake, duress, or intoxication “produced by the acts or contrivance of third 
persons.”  Id.  James Goss presented sufficient evidence demonstrating that his 
intoxication could have reasonably been caused by the acts of a third party. 
In denying the instruction, the trial judge said: 
There was never any testimony from Mr. Goss that at the time the drink 
that he was speaking about was poured for him that it was ever done 
outside of his presence.  So the Court can only assume that he was 
watching the gentleman when he poured the drink and gave it directly to 
him.  I guess he wants the Court to infer that perhaps that—assume rather 
that perhaps the incident occurred while his cup was left and he was at the 
Art Scape.  
 
(Tr2. 122) (emphasis added).  However, the question of whether James Goss’ drink had 
been spiked was a logical inference based on the evidence presented that should have 
been left for the jury.  See Dykes, 319 Md. at 224 (stating that “when the trial judge 
resolves conflicts in the evidence . . . because he believes that the evidence supporting the 
request is incredible or too weak or overwhelmed by other evidence, he improperly 
assumes the jury’s role as fact-finder”).  For example, contrary to the trial judge’s 
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assumption, there was no testimony that James Goss watched the host pour his drink 
when he first arrived at the party. (Tr.2, 86). In addition, Mr. Goss’ testimony that he 
believed he had been drugged, along with testimony demonstrating that after his drink 
was first poured there were multiple opportunities for his drink to have been tampered 
with, was some evidence that his intoxication was produced by the acts or contrivances of 
third parties.  On this record, there was “some evidence” of James Goss’ intoxication, 
either voluntary or involuntary, and the trial court’s failure to give the requested 
instructions was error. See Dykes, 319 Md. at 216 (stating that the trial judge has a duty to 
present the law that governs any defenses supported by “some evidence” adduced at 
trial).   
 Finally, the failure to give these instructions clearly prejudiced James Goss.  James 
Goss did not dispute that he was the person who attacked Officer Parris.  Rather, his 
defense was that at the time he engaged in that conduct he was under the influence of 
some substance that rendered him substantially impaired.  By refusing to allow these 
instructions, the defense’s entire trial strategy was undermined and could not be 
presented or even referenced in closing arguments.  As defense counsel explained to the 
court following the denial of the intoxication instruction, “Clearly, this was my defense.” 
(Tr.2, 136).  
 James Goss’ testimony and the testimony of others was sufficient to provide 
“some evidence” that Goss was intoxicated at the time he attacked Officer Parris, Ms. 
Hall, and the security guard.  Goss also provided “some evidence” that this intoxication 
was involuntary.  Because the trial judge erred in denying the requested instruction, and 
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because James Goss’ main defense was the fact that he was intoxicated at the time he 
attacked the officer, the failure to give the instructions clearly prejudiced the defense and 
thus constitute reversible error.  
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CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Goss respectfully asks that his conviction be 
vacated and his case be remanded for a new trial. 
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TEXT OF CONSTITIONAL PROVISIONS,  
STATUTES, AND RULES 
 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 
 
U.S. Const. amend. VI.  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.  
 
MARYLAND CONSTITUTION 
 
Maryland Declaration of Rights, art. XXI.  
That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of the accusation 
against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in due time (if required) to 
prepare for his defence; to be allowed counsel; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have process for his witnesses; to examine the witnesses for and against 
him on oath; and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent 
he ought not to be found guilty. 
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